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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to and the conditions under which re-
source misallocation negatively aects aggregate productivity in a model
of heterogeneous rms to the highest degree. I analytically derive the
minimum aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) under resource mis-
allocation, when frictions are modeled as the taxes levied on a rm's
output, and the range of these taxes is provided. I nd that the lower
limit of the minimum aggregate TFP is the TFP under perfect substitute
goods and constant returns to scale technology. Further, with the excep-
tion of particular parameter values in which the misallocation eect on
aggregate TFP is small, the minimum aggregate TFP is achieved when
the proportion of rms in the lowest tax level is small or when the TFP
level of these rms is low.
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1 Introduction
Cross-country dierences in the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) are
one of the important sources for the income disparity between developed and
underdeveloped countries. A large body of research proposes mechanisms that
explain the dierences in the aggregate TFP. As Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)
point out, many of these mechanisms can be characterized as the theory of
resource misallocation. This theory states that frictions due to various reasons
prevent the ecient use of resources, resulting in a low aggregate TFP.
This paper poses the following questions: To what extent do resource misal-
locations aect the aggregate TFP? What kind of resource misallocation aects
the aggregate TFP the most? This paper analytically addresses both these
questions. There are two reasons for posing these questions. First, it is useful
to know the applicability limit of the theory. Because there are innite possibil-
ities for resource misallocation between rms, the maximum eect of resource
misallocation is not apparent. Second, the result provides information about the
kind of resource misallocation mechanism researchers should focus on. While
in the standard Ramsey problem, we analyze the conditions under which the
maximum welfare is achieved, this paper analyzes the conditions under which
the minimum aggregate TFP is achieved. In this sense, this paper inverses the
standard Ramsey problem. Hence, I refer to this paper's analysis as an inverse
Ramsey problem.
In order to answer the abovementioned questions, I develop a simple model
of monopolistic (or perfect) competition with heterogeneous rms that draws
heavily from previous works (Melitz, 2003, Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008, Hsieh
and Klenow, 2007, and Alfaro, Charlton and Kanczuk, 2008). Following Restuc-
cia and Rogerson (2008), frictions are described as the taxes levied on a rm's
output. In this model, the dierences in the taxes across rms result in resource
misallocation and the loss of the aggregate TFP.1
1Although this model is static, we observe that the numerical value of the aggregate TFP
is the same as that obtained in the dynamic model of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
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Using the model, I address the abovementioned questions. I derive the min-
imum level of this aggregate TFP when the lower and upper bounds of the tax
levels are provided, and obtain the conditions under the minimum aggregate
TFP.2 In the model, the higher the elasticity of substitution of goods and the
rm's returns to scale, the lower is the minimum aggregate TFP. The lower
limit of the minimum aggregate TFP is the TFP under perfect substitute goods
and constant returns to scale technology, where the minimum aggregate TFP
relative to the TFP with no frictions is equal to the ratio of the gross maxi-
mum and minimum tax levels (the gross tax level implies 1   , where  is the
taxes levied on a rm's output). The result suggests that researchers should
focus on resource misallocation between rms or sectors that produce relatively
substitutable goods.
Further, I nd that with the exception of particular parameter values in
which the eect of resource misallocation on the aggregate TFP is small, the
minimum aggregate TFP is achieved if the proportion of rms in the minimum
tax level is small or if the TFP of these rms is low. Thus, resource misallocation
is not necessarily related to the TFP levels of rms.3 The result is consistent
with the hypotheses that the aggregate TFP of underdeveloped countries is low
because a small number of rms such as state-owned enterprises are protected
by government policies or because the low TFP rms are protected by monopoly
rights (Parente and Prescott, 1999) or by size-dependent policies (Guner, Ven-
tura and Xu, 2008). However, this paper also reveals that to be consistent with
data, the latter hypotheses might need some modications, if goods are highly
substitutive and the rm's returns to scale is high. On the other hand, the re-
sult suggests that the hypothesis that attributes the low aggregate TFP to the
borrowing constraint of small rms might encounter diculties when explaining
2I select the ratio of the (gross) lower and upper tax levels as the basis of plausibility. Since
the dierences in the (gross) taxes imply the dierences in the factor input returns, a large
dierence in the lower and upper tax levels is implausible from the viewpoint of arbitrage.
Under the criterion, we need to explain the dierences in the aggregate TFP with a reasonable
ratio of these taxes. Parente and Prescott (2005, pp.1394{1395) developed a similar argument.
3Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) have noted this point. I analytically clarify that both the
proportion and TFP of taxed rms quantitatively have the same eect on the aggregate TFP.
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the low aggregate TFP in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, I nd that we
need to maintain caution when applying the lognormal approximation, which is
widely used in the research.
There is a growing body of literature that analyzes the eect of resource
misallocation on the aggregate TFP using the general equilibrium model of
heterogeneous rms. Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and
Jones (2008) theoretically analyze the eect of resource misallocation under
several scenarios. While their papers rst consider the scenarios of resource
misallocation and then analyze their eects on the aggregate TFP, this paper
rst determines the lowest level of the aggregate TFP resulting from resource
misallocation and then analyzes the scenario that achieves the lowest aggregate
TFP. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2008), among others, measure
frictions on resource misallocation and calculate the eect of these frictions on
the aggregate TFP. This paper's analysis will help analyze what kind of resource
misallocation is important to their results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model, and Section 3 denes the aggregate TFP. Given these settings, Section 4
solves the inverse Ramsey problem and analyzes the implication of the results.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Model
I consider an economy where the nal goods are produced from the intermediate
goods by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, the intermediate
goods are produced by a constant proportion of monopolistically (or perfectly)
competitive rms using capital and labor, and the aggregate capital and labor
supply is exogenously provided. In this model, frictions are modeled as taxes
levied on the intermediate rm's output.
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2.1 Final goods sector
Firms in the nal goods sector produce nal goods Y from intermediate goods
fyig. Further, rms in the nal goods sector are competitive and maximize the
following problem:
max
fyig
Y (fyig) 
Z
piyidi;
where
Y (fyig) =
Z
yi di
 1

;
and pi is an intermediate good price. I assume that   1 and  6= 0 (for the
lower bound of , see the next section).
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
pi = y
 1
i Y
1 ; (1)
Y =
Z
piyidi: (2)
2.2 Intermediate goods sector
Firms in the intermediate goods sector produce intermediate goods yi from
capital ki and labor li. The prot maximization problem of a monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods rm is as follows:
max
ki;li
(1  i)piyi   rki   wli; (3)
s.t. yi = aiki l

i ;
where pi is given by (1), ai is the rm's TFP, and r and w are the factor
costs of capital and labor, respectively. I assume that 0 <  +   1 and that
(+ ) < 1.
While, here, i corresponds to a rm that is the price setter for its output, we
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can instead consider a model in which i corresponds to a sector and the rms
in each sector are price takers. The results after Section 3 do not change even if
we adopt the latter setting. When the intermediate rms are monopolistically
competitive,  has to be more than zero. In Section 4, I also deal with the case
where  < 0 because the  < 0 case is analyzed in some multi-sector models
(e.g., Ngai and Pissarides, 2007 and Duarte and Restuccia, 2007). Thus, for the
 < 0 case, I assume that the intermediate rms are perfectly competitive.
From the FOCs, we obtain the following relation:
ki =
(1  i)
r
piyi; (4)
li =
1
(1 + li)w
piyi:
2.3 Resource constraints
The following resource constraints are satised:
Z
kidi = K;
Z
lidi = L;
whereK and L are the aggregate supply of capital and labor, respectively, which
are exogenously provided.
2.4 Equilibrium allocation
Here, I derive the equilibrium allocation of Y . Substituting (4) into the resource
constraint of capital, we obtain
1
r
=
KR
piyiidi
where i  (1  i). Substituting this equation into (4) and on rearranging, we
obtain
ki = ~i~iK; (5)
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where ~i  piyi=(
R
piyidi) and ~i  i=(
R
~iidi). In the same way, we can
obtain
li = ~i~iL: (6)
By substituting the results arrived at, Y can be rewritten as follows:
Y =
Z
ai ~

i
~i di
 1

KL ;
where   + .
In order to obtain the equilibrium allocation of Y , I derive the equilibrium
allocations of ~i and ~i. Appendix A shows the following:
~i =
ai 

i
W
; (7)
where   1=(1  ) and
W =
Z
ai 

i di: (8)
Using (7), the denominator of ~i is written as follows:
Z
~iidi =
Z
W
;
where
Z =
Z
ai 

i di: (9)
By using the derived ~i and ~i, we nally obtain the equilibrium allocation of
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Y as follows:4
Y =
W
1

Z
KL : (10)
3 Aggregate TFP
I dene the aggregate TFP A as follows:
A  Y
KL
:
Subsequently, the aggregate TFP in equilibrium is given by
A =
W
1

Z
: (11)
This equation can be rewritten as follows:
A = AN;
where
A 
Z
adi
 1
 
;
N 
Z
aiR
ai di
i di
 1

,Z
aiR
ai di

1

i di

;
and i  i . A is the aggregate TFP level when there is no friction. I refer
to N as the relative TFP because it corresponds to the aggregate TFP relative
to the TFP with no frictions. Since
dHi  a

iR
ai di
di
4This is a slightly extended version of the one obtained in Alfaro et al. (2008).
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can be considered as a distribution, N can be further revised as follows:
N =
Z
i dHi
 1

,Z

1

i dHi

:
We can conrm N  1 from the property of power means, because  < 1=.
In the following sections, I analyze how N can be lowered by resource mis-
allocation. Moreover, I only consider the case wherein the number of tax levels
is nite. Subsequently, N can be rewritten as follows (here, I slightly modify
the notations):
N =
 X
i
hi

i
! 1

, X
i
hi
1

i
!
;
where hi is the proportion of rms in the same tax level, adjusted by the rm's
TFP
hi 
Z
j:fj=ig
ajR
aj dj
dj: (12)
Obviously,
P
i hi = 1.
4 Inverse Ramsey Problem
4.1 Derivation of the minimum relative TFP
This section derives the minimum relative TFP, Nmin, when the gross minimum
tax level s  (1   s) and the gross maximum tax level t  (1   t) are
exogenously provided.5 Here, I use the subscript s for the variables with the
minimum tax level, and subscript t for those with the maximum tax level.
Obviously, we assume that s  t.
Owing to the following proposition, we only need to consider the distribution
of s and t (the proof is presented in Appendix B).
5As will be revealed later, in fact, we do not need to determine the absolute values of s
and t to derive Nmin (we only need to determine the ratio of s and t).
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Proposition 1. Nmin is achieved under the following condition: hs + ht = 1.
Then, the inverse Ramsey problem is as follows:
Nmin = min
hs
N (13)
s.t. N = (hss + ht

t )
1

.
hs
1

s + ht
1

t

; (14)
hs + ht = 1:
From the FOC, we obtain hs, which achieves Nmin, hs;min as follows:6
hs;min =
1
1  


   1  
1

1
   1

;
where   s=t. By substituting this equation into (14), we obtain Nmin as
follows:
Nmin =
"
1  
1  
1  


# 1
(15)
where
  
   1

1
   1 =


1    1

1
1    1
;   s=t:
Nmin has the following limit values:
Nmin    !
!0
e 

 1

ln
  1

; (16)
   !
!1
1

: (17)
6Appendix C proves that the second-order condition is positive (i.e., N obtained is the
local minimum). Since N under the implicit corner solutions (hs = 0 and hs = 1) is equal
to unity and coincides with the no fraction level, the N that satises the FOC is the global
minimum.
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4.2 Analysis of the result
This section analyzes the results obtained in the previous section, when  
(1  s)=(1  t) is between one and ten.7
Figure 1 plots the minimum relative TFP Nmin for the following three cases
using (15), (16), and (17): (i)  =  1:5 and  = 1, (ii)  ! 0 and  = 1,
(iii)  = 1 and  = 0:85, and (iv)  ! 1. The parameter values of the rst
case are similar to those used in Duarte and Restuccia (2007). The parameter
values of the second case are similar to those in Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008)
and Hayashi and Prescott (2008) in the long run.8 The third case corresponds
to Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), and the fourth case corresponds to Parente
and Prescott (1999). The second and third cases can generate a large loss of
the aggregate TFP caused by resource misallocation, while the rst case has a
relatively low ability. One might infer from Figure 1 that Nmin lowers as 
increases. This inference is correct (for an explanation, see Appendix D). The
result is analogous to the implication of the standard Ramsey problem that
taxes on goods with elastic demand highly distort welfare.
An interesting point is that the correlation of the rm's TFP and tax level
is not required to generate the above results. Although the rm's TFP enters
into hs, hs can be changed arbitrarily by changing the proportion of rms.
This result is particularly interesting when Nmin converges to the Parente and
Prescott (1999) case, because only at the limit, the proportion of rms does not
aect the aggregate TFP.
Another interesting point is the discrepancy between the analysis in this
paper and the lognormal approximation used in the literature.9 If we assume
that the distribution of the rm's TFP and tax is approximated by a joint
lognormal distribution, from (11), the aggregate TFP can be approximated as
7The value of ten for  corresponds to, for example, the rental rate variation between 3%
to 30% (under the same risk), which I think is reasonable as the upper bound.
8The papers corresponding to the second to fourth cases pertain to the theory of resource
misallocation.
9See, for example, Manuelli (2003), Hsieh and Klenow (2007), and Jones (2008).
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follows (for the derivation, see Appendix E.1):
A ' exp

ln a +
1
2
1
1  
 
2ln a   2ln

;
where ln a is the mean of ln ai, and 2ln a and 
2
ln are the variances of ln ai and
lni. Suppose that 2ln a = 0 and 
2
ln > 0. Then, as  converges to unity, the
aggregate TFP converges to zero, even if the variance of taxes is considerably
small. The result stems from a characteristic of the lognormal distribution that
its domain is unbounded. Our result suggests that caution is required when the
lognormal approximation is applied.
Next, I examine the composition of rms under the minimum relative TFP.
I plot the hs under the minimum relative TFP, hs;min, in Figure 2. We nd
that for small , hs;min is close to 0.5, regardless of the values of  and . We
can verify the property by applying the second-order Taylor approximation to
the logarithm of (14) around  = 1 as follows (for the derivation, see Appendix
E.2):
lnN '  1
2

1  hs(1  hs)(  1)
2:
Thus, for  around unity, N() becomes the minimum when hs = 0:5.
On the other hand, hs;min becomes smaller as  increases, except for the
case    1. We can verify this as follows. When  > 0, for suciently large
, N given by (14) approximately becomes as follows (for the derivation, see
Appendix E.3):10
N ' h
1
 
s : (18)
Since 1=    > 0, this N becomes smaller, as hs decreases. When  < 0, for
suciently large , N given by (14) approximately becomes as follows (for the
10(18) also achieves the lower bound of Restuccia and Rogerson's (2008) numerical exper-
iment. For example, in their uncorrelated case, wherein the frictions were uncorrelated with
the rm's TFPs, hs corresponds to 0.5. Then, the lower bound of the relative TFP given by
(18) is (1=2)0:15  0:90, which is close to their lowest value.
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derivation, see Appendix E.4):
N =
1
h
  1
t h

s

1 
: (19)
The result shows that when  >  1, as in the case that  > 0, N becomes
smaller as hs decreases. However, when    1, N becomes smaller as hs
increases.
Moreover, Figure 2 shows that hs;min decreases as  increases. This is
because, as (18) and (19) suggest, the maximum eect of the frictions lowers as
 increases. In order to compensate for it, hs should be lower.
4.3 What kind of resource misallocation should be focused
on?
The results in the previous section suggest that in order to understand the large
dierences in aggregate TFP between developed and underdeveloped countries,
it is important to focus on resource misallocation between rms or sectors that
produce relatively substitutable goods that corresponds to the  > 0 in our
model.
It is also important to explore the resource misallocations that are consis-
tent with small hs in order to consider the source of the large dierences in
aggregate TFP. The hypothesis that a small proportion of rms, for example,
state-owned enterprises, are selectively protected by the government policies is
consistent with small hs. The hypothesis that low TFP rms are protected is
also consistent with small hs. Table 1 reports the hi of rms (referred to as
establishments in their paper) classied by the TFP levels (instead of the same
tax level) in the U.S., which is calculated from Table 2 in Restuccia and Roger-
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son (2008).11 The hi of rms with the lowest TFP is 0.08, although such rms
constitute more than half of all rms. Hence, if rms with the lowest TFP are
protected, it considerably lowers the aggregate TFP. However, it should also be
noted that hs;min with high  and relatively high  is smaller than 0.08, for
example, hs;min at  = 0:85 and  = 2 is less than 0.05 (see Figure 3, which
plots the limits of  above which hs;min falls below 0.08). Thus, even if we focus
on resource misallocation with respect to the low TFP rms, it is important to
explore the possibility that some of the low TFP rms are selectively protected.
On the other hand, it might be dicult to explain the large dierences in
the aggregate TFP by means of the borrowing constraint of small rms. This
is because these small rms belong to (1 hs;min) of rms, while as observed in
Table 1, the hi of small rms is marginal.
5 Conclusion
This paper analytically examines the extent to and the conditions under which
resource misallocation negatively aects the aggregate TFP to the highest de-
gree, when frictions are modeled as the taxes levied on a rm's output. The
implications derived from the analysis would be eective in researching the
mechanisms of resource misallocation that explain the dierences in the aggre-
gate TFP of developed and underdeveloped countries.
There are several important issues that still need to be addressed in future
research. First, while I derive the minimum aggregate TFP when the lower and
upper tax levels are provided, other specications on the constraint of frictions
might be possible. Second, I abstract from xed costs. Qualitatively, under
11 Using (12), the hi is measured as
hi =
gia

i∑
i gia

i
=
gili∑
i gili
;
where gi is the fraction of i rms, and li is rm i's labor input of the U.S. under the assumption
that the U.S. is an economy with no frictions. Note that the measured hi does not depend on
 and .
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xed costs, higher frictions on the lower TFP rms (higher frictions imply higher
taxes in this paper's model) can discourage these rms from operation and entry,
which results in lowering the aggregate TFP. Thus, lower frictions on a small
proportion of relatively high TFP rms negatively aect the aggregate TFP the
most. In order to quantitatively analyze this eect, assumptions on the xed
costs and the distribution of rms that are not arbitrary are required. Finally,
as emphasized in Jones (2008), the existence of material inputs could magnify
the resource misallocation eect.
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Appendix
A Derivation of ~i
By using (1) and (2), ~i can be written as follows:
~i =
yi
Y 
=
ai ~

i 

iR
ai ~

i 

i di
;
where   + . By rewriting this equation, we obtain
~i =
ai 

i
W
;
where   1=(1  ) and W is dened as
W 
Z
ai ~

i 

i di

:
W can be further extended as follows:
W =
0@Z ai i
 
ai 

ii
W
!
di
1A :
By rearranging W , we thus obtain
W =
Z
ai 

i di:
Using this result, ~i can be expressed by exogenous variables.
B Proof of Proposition 1
I prove Proposition 1 by contradiction.
Suppose that there are n tax levels between s and t with positive hi. Sub-
sequently, s > 1; : : : ; i; : : : n > t, where i  i . The following conditions
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should be satised:
@ lnN
@i
= 0; for all i between s and t.
If these conditions are not satised, N can be lowered by changing i between
s and t. @ lnN=@i is given by
@ lnN
@i
=
hi
i
0B@ 1
hi +
P
m6=i hm

m
i
   1
hi +
P
m6=i hm

m
i
 1

1CA = 0: (20)
From this condition, we obtain

  1
i =
P
m hm

mP
m hm
1

m
:
Since this condition holds for any j between s and t, i = j . Thus, we only
need to consider the case wherein there is one i between s and t.
Next, I examine the second-order condition (SOC) of lnN when (20) is
satised. I refer to the denominator of the rst term in the parenthesis in (20)
as B, and the second term as C. Then,
@2 lnN
@2i
=  hi
2i

1
B
  1
C

+
hi
i


i
B   hi
B2
  1
i
C   hi
C2

=
hi
2i
hs

s
i

+ ht

t
i

B2
(   1)  0:
Equality holds only if hs = ht = 0. Then, the maximum of N is achieved. Oth-
erwise, N becomes the local maximum. Both cases contradict the assumption
that N is the minimum.
C Second-Order Condition of N
I demonstrate that the SOC of the problem provided in (13) is positive for
 > 1. Note that, here, I use lnN instead of N .
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The FOC is given by
@ lnN
@hs
=
1

b
B
   c
C
= 0;
where b  s   t , B  hss + htt , c  1=s   1=t , and C  hs1=s + ht1=t .
The SOC when the FOC is satised is
@2 lnN
@h2s
=  1


b
B
2
+ 
 c
C
2
= 
 c
C
2
(1  ) > 0:
D Nmin Lowers as  ! 1
Figure 4 displays Nmin powered by 1=, over the ranges of  and . In this
gure, for any , N1=min lowers as  increases. The shape of the gure is pre-
served for Nmin. Thus, for any given , Nmin also lowers as  increases (i.e., 
increases). In addition, for any given , Nmin lowers as  increases. Therefore,
Nmin lowers as  and  increase.
E Derivation of Approximations in Section 4.2
This appendix derives approximations employed in Section 4.2.
E.1 Lognormal approximation of A
Suppose that xi is a variable of intermediate rm i. Then, the following ap-
proximation holds:
ln
Z
xidi

' ln x + 12
2
ln x;
where ln x and 2ln x are the mean and variance of lnxi. By applying this
approximation to lnW 1= and lnZ, where W and Z are given by (8) and (9),
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we obtain
lnW
1
 ' 

ln a + ln +
1
2

2ln a + 
22ln + 2ln a;ln

;
lnZ ' 

ln a + ln +
1
2

22ln a + 
2
ln + 2ln a;ln

;
where ln a;ln is the covariance of ln ai and lni. Therefore, from (11) and the
above approximations, we obtain
lnA ' ln a + 12
1
1  
 
2ln a   2ln

:
E.2 lnN when  is close to unity
Rewriting N in (14) using the denitions i  =(1 )i and   s=t, we
obtain
N() =
(hs

1  + ht)
1

(hs
1
1  + ht)
: (21)
(Here, I explicitly write N as the function of .)
By applying the second-order Taylor expansion around  = 1, lnN() is
approximately written as follows (here, for the simplicity of calculation, I take
log to N):
lnN() ' lnN(1) + lnN 0(1)(  1) + lnN
00(1)
2
(  1)2:
Since lnN(1) = 0, lnN 0(1) = 0, and lnN 00(1) =  =(1  )hs(1  hs),
lnN() '  1
2

1  hs(1  hs)(  1)
2;
when  is close to unity. Thus, for  around unity, N() becomes the minimum
when hs = 0:5.
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E.3 N when  is large: the  > 0 case
When  is large and  > 0, from (21), we obtain
N() ' (hs

1  )
1

(hs
1
1  )
= h
1
 
s :
E.4 N when  is large: the  < 0 case
Dene     > 0. Then, from (21), we obtain
N() =


1 
hs + ht

1 
 1


hs
1
1  + ht

' 

1 
h
1

t h

s
2
1 
=
1
h
1

t h

s

1 
:
From the rst line to the second line, I apply an approximation assuming that
 is large.
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Firm size Small Medium Large
Share of rms 0.56 0.39 0.05
Average employment 2.4 15.5 183.0
hi 0.08 0.37 0.55
Table 1: Distribution of rms. Notes: These numbers were obtained and cal-
culated from Table 2 of Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) (rms are referred to
as establishments in their paper). hi is the proportion of rms with the same
TFP level, adjusted by their TFP, and is calculated in a manner similar to (12)
(here, hi is for rms with the same TFP level instead of the same tax level).
For the calculation of hi, see footnote 11.
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m
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ρ = − 1.5, θ = 1
ρ → 0, θ = 1
ρ = 1, θ = 0.85
ρθ → 1
Figure 1: The minimum relative TFP, Nmin, under dierent parameter values.
Notes:  is the parameter on the substitutability of goods.  is the rm's returns
to scale.  is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax levels, (1 s)=(1 t).
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Figure 2: Proportion of rms with the lowest tax level, adjusted by the rm's
TFP, hs;min that generates the minimum relative TFP, Nmin, under a range of
parameter values. Notes:  is the parameter on the substitutability of goods. 
is the rm's returns to scale.  is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax
levels, (1  s)=(1  t).
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Figure 3: The limit of  above which hs;min that generates Nmin falls below
0.08, for each . Notes:  is the parameter on the substitutability of goods. 
is the rm's returns to scale.  is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest tax
levels, (1  s)=(1  t). For example, for  = 2,   0:82, which implies that
with this  and  > 0:82, hs;min becomes less than 0.08.
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Figure 4: The minimum relative TFP powered by 1=, N1=min under a range of
parameter values. Notes:  is the parameter on the substitutability of goods.
 is the rm's returns to scale.  is the ratio of the gross lowest and highest
taxes, (1  s)=(1  t).
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